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Abstract
These are momentous times in Europe. The Euro has been successfully introduced, the enlargement negotiations are approaching their climax, and the European Convention (“Convention”) is moving towards the drafting of a constitution for a new, continent-wide political entity.
At the same time, unrest is manifest, particularly in two areas. On the one hand, many of our
citizens, and not just the political elites, are dissatisfied with Europe’s performance on the world
stage and are concerned about the maintenance of peace and security within the Union. In these
areas they would like to see a strengthened, more effective entity– “more Europe.” On the other
hand, their disenchantment with the long reach of European Union (“EU” or “Union”) regulation
in the first pillar area of economic policy is growing. The feeling of loss of local control over their
destiny and a vague feeling of potential loss of identity within an ever more centralized polity is
palpable. Here, they want “less Europe.” In the outside world, change is also the order of the day.
The ice-sheet of bipolarity, which overlaid and hid the complexity of international relations during the Cold War, is breaking up at an ever-increasing speed and revealing a world in which two
paradigms are competing to become the underlying ordering principles for the new century. The
traditional paradigm of interacting Nation States, each pursuing its own separate interests, with
alliances allowing the small to compete with the large, is alive and well, and its proponents like
Machiavelli or Churchill continue to be in vogue in the literature of international relations and the
rhetoric of world leaders. At the same time, there is a school of thought which points to the growing economic and ecological interdependence of our societies and the necessity for new forms of
global governance to complement national action. It is also becoming abundantly clear that the
concept of a “Nation State” is often a fiction, positing as it does an identity between the citizens
of a State and the members of a culturally homogenous society. For both reasons, the concept of
the Nation State as the principal actor on the world stage, is called into question. The experience
of the Union with the sharing of State sovereignty is clearly related to the second paradigm and
also to the EU’s firm support for the development of the United Nations (“U.N.”) as well as other
elements of multilateral governance. It would hardly be wise to suggest that any foreign policy,
and certainly not that of the EU, should be based only on this paradigm. Given the recurrent threats
to security, which seem to be part of the human condition expressed by some as the “inevitability
of war”–the defense of territorial integrity; action against threats of aggression; and resistance to
crimes against humanity such as genocide–the ability to conduct a security policy based much
more on the old paradigm of interacting interests will continue to be required. That the EU needs
to develop such a capability will be taken here as a given. Such a crisis-management capability
will be essential to the Union, but will be distinguished here from the more long-term elements of
foreign policy, which can be thought of as being designed to reduce the need for crisis management

in the context of a security policy to a minimum. The crisis-management area of policy will not be
treated further here. The thesis of this Essay is that the same set of political concepts can serve as
a guide to the future internal development of the EU and as the basis of such a long-term foreign
policy. Furthermore, it suggests that neither should be seen in terms of the balancing of interests
but rather, as the expression of a small list of fundamental values. The list is as follows: (1) the
rule of law as the basis for relations between members of society; (2) the interaction between the
democratic process and entrenched human rights in political decision-making; (3) the operation of
competition within a market economy as the source of increasing prosperity; (4) the anchoring of
the principle of solidarity among all members of society alongside that of the liberty of the individual; (5) the adoption of the principle of sustainability of all economic development; and (6) the
preservation of separate identities and the maintenance of cultural diversity within society. These
values can be seen as the answer to the question posed both, by citizens of the Union and by our
fellow citizens of the world: “What does the EU stand for?” In exploring these values we should,
however, remember that in the real world there will be occasions on which Realpolitik will intrude
and the interest-based paradigm will prevail.

THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE WORLDA COMMUNITY OF VALUES
John Richardson*
INTRODUCTION
These are momentous times in Europe. The Euro has been
successfully introduced,' the enlargement negotiations are approaching their climax,' and the European Convention ("Convention") is moving towards the drafting of a constitution for a
new, continent-wide political entity.3
At the same time, unrest is manifest, particularly in two areas. On the one hand, many of our citizens, and not just the
political elites, are dissatisfied with Europe's performance on the
world stage and are concerned about the maintenance of peace
and security within the Union (in what the Treaty of the European Union ("TEU") calls "the area of Justice and Home Affairs"). 4 In these areas they would like to see a strengthened,
more effective entity - "more Europe." On the other hand,
their disenchantment with the long reach of European Union
("EU" or "Union") regulation in the first pillar area of economic
policy5 is growing. The feeling of loss of local control over their
* Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to the
United Nations; Member, Board of the European Institute; Member, Board of the Salzburg Seminar; former Minister and Deputy Head of the European Commission's Delegation in Washington; former Head of Division for relations with the United States and
with Japan.
1. See GEORGE A. BERMANN, ROGERJ. GOEBEL, WILLIAMJ. DAVEY & ELEANOR M. Fox,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW ch.33 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing European Economic and Monetary Union) [hereinafter GOEBEL, ET.AL.].
2. See Eneko Landaburu, The Fifth Enlargement of the European Union: the Power of
Example, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (2002).
3. See Laeken European Council, Presidency conclusions, E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 7
(2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/.
4. Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, arts. 29-42, O.J. C 340/
2, at 162-68 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 67 at 22-28 (ex arts. K.1-K14) [hereinafter Consolidated
TEU], incorporatingchanges made by Treaty of Amsterdam, amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related
acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] (amending
Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), Treaty establishing the European Community
("EC Treaty"), Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC
Treaty"), and Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom
Treaty") and renumbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty).
5. See Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community,
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destiny and a vague feeling of potential loss of identity within an
ever more centralized polity is palpable. Here, they want "less
Europe."
In the outside world, change is also the order of the day.
The ice-sheet of bipolarity, which overlaid and hid the complexity of international relations during the Cold War, is breaking up
at an ever-increasing speed and revealing a world in which two
paradigms are competing to become the underlying ordering
principles for the new century. The traditional paradigm of interacting Nation States, each pursuing its own separate interests,
with alliances allowing the small to compete with the large, is
alive and well, and its proponents like Machiavelli or Churchill
continue to be in vogue in the literature of international relations and the rhetoric of world leaders.
At the same time, there is a school of thought which points
to the growing economic and ecological interdependence of our
societies and the necessity for new forms of global governance to
complement national action. It is also becoming abundantly
clear that the concept of a "Nation State" is often a fiction, positing as it does an identity between the citizens: of a State and the
members of a culturally homogenous society. For both reasons,
the concept of the Nation State as the principal actor on the
world stage, is called into question.
The experience of the Union with the sharing of State sovereignty is clearly related to the second paradigm and also to the
EU's firm support for the development of the United Nations
("U.N.") as well as other elements of multilateral governance. It
would hardly be wise to suggest that any foreign policy, and certainly not that of the EU, should be based only on this paradigm.
Given the recurrent threats to security, which seem to be part of
the human condition expressed by some as the "inevitability of
war" - the defense of territorial integrity; action against threats
of aggression; and resistance to crimes against humanity such as
genocide - the ability to conduct a security policy based much
more on the old paradigm of interacting interests will continue
to be required. That the EU needs to develop such a capability
will be taken here as a given. Such a crisis-management capabilart. 159, O.J. C 340/3 (1997), at 250-51, 37 I.L.M. 79 at 112-13 (ex art. 130b) [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty], incoporating changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra
n,4.
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ity will be essential to the Union, but will be distinguished here
from the more long-term elements of foreign policy, which can
be thought of as being designed to reduce the need for crisis
management in the context of a security policy to a minimum.
The crisis-management area of policy will not be treated further
here.
The thesis of this Essay is that the same set of political concepts can serve as a guide to the future internal development of
the EU and as the basis of such a long-term foreign policy. Furthermore, it suggests that neither should be seen in terms of the
balancing of interests but rather, as the expression of a small list
of fundamental values. The list is as follows:
• the rule of law as the basis for relations between members
of society;
* the interaction between the democratic process and entrenched human rights in political decision-making;
" the operation of competition within a market economy as
the source of increasing prosperity;
" the anchoring of the principle of solidarity among all
members of society alongside that of the liberty of the individual;
* the adoption of the principle of sustainability of all economic development; and
" the preservation of separate identities and the maintenance of cultural diversity within society.
These values can be seen as the answer to the question
posed both, by citizens of the Union and by our fellow citizens of
the world: "What does the EU stand for?"6 In exploring these
values we should, however, remember that in the real world
there will be occasions on which Realpolitik will intrude and the
interest-based paradigm will prevail.
I. VALUES AND INTERESTS IN EXTERNAL RELATIONS
IN THE EU TREATIES
Article 11 of the TEU defines only the objectives of the common foreign and security policy ("CFSP"), and not those of the
6. There is, of course, no reason why other countries in other regions of the world
should not share these values and to the extent that they do, they are the EU's natural
partners in its endeavors.
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other economic elements of the Union's external policy.7
Trade, development, international environmental, and monetary policies are covered elsewhere in the treaties.'
Article 11 does not choose between the two paradigms suggested above. It simply mentions both by committing to "safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence
and integrity of the Union."9 It does, however, add that this goal
should be pursued "in conformity with the principles of the
United Nations Charter.' ' 0 This can certainly be interpreted as
a clear choice in favor of a foreign policy based on principles
and not just on Realpolitik.
Article 11 also defines the objective "to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human
7. See Consolidated TEU, supra n.4, art. 11, 0.J. C 340/2, at 155 (1997), 37 I.L.M.
at 15 (ex art. J.I). Article 11 provides:
1. The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security
policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of
which shall be
-to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence
and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United
Nations Charter;
-to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
-to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance
with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles
of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including
those on external borders;
-to promote international cooperation;
-to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
2. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy
actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.
The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary
to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.
The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.
Id.
8. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra n.5, Title IX, arts. 131-34, 0J.C 340/3, at
237-38 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 99-100 (ex Title VII, arts. 110-15) (setting out international
trade provisions of common commercial policy); see also Title XX, arts. 177-81, O.J. C
340/3, at 256-57 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 118-19 (ex Title XVII, arts. 130u to 130y) (setting
out development cooperation provisions); art. 174(4), O.J. C 340/3, at 255 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 117 (ex art. 130r(4)) (setting out international environmental provision); art.
111, 0.J. C 340/3, at 223-24 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 85-86 (ex art. 109) (setting out international monetary provision).
9. Consolidated TEU, supra n.4, art. 11 (1), 0J. C 340/3, at 184 (1997), 37 I.L.M.
at 46 (ex art. J.1).
10. Id.
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rights and fundamental freedoms." ' "I This is also a value-based
objective.
Additionally, Article 11 adopts the objectives of both, the
"security" of the Union and "peace" and "international security,"
again in conformity, inter alia, with the U.N. Charter, thereby
seemingly ruling out acting in defiance of the Charter. Once
again, this is a clear choice in favor of adding value-based constraints to foreign policy actions carried out for reasons of the
defense of interests. A further objective commits the Union "to
promote international cooperation," presumably thereby eschewing conflict.
Only the remaining objective of Article 11, "to strengthen
the security of the Union in all ways,''12 seems to leave the door
open to the Union using any means at its disposal in time of
necessity. Only a hopeless idealist could be surprised at this concession to the harsh realities of the contemporary world and the
cruel lessons of history. But it is also clear that it represents a
garde-fou for what is otherwise a values-based foreign policy. To
give a concrete example, if the Union wishes to avoid Iraq, Iran,
or North Korea developing and threatening to use weapons of
mass destruction, it should be pursuing a dual-track policy of trying to export its values to them through engagement while preparing for the eventuality of the failure of this policy leading to a
security crisis. This is indeed what is currently being attempted. 13
The concentration of Article 11 on value-based policies for
the CFSP elements of the EU's external action is further
strengthened if we extend the discussion to include other elements of the EU's external relations, as included in the European Economic Community Treaty ("EEC Treaty").' 4 External
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. For a discussion on European Council foreign policy statements concerning
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, see e.g. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON THE
AcriviTiES OF TiHE EUROPEAN UNION 2001, no. 12, at 28-30, 39 (sec. 1, par. 836-38, 847);

at 5, 16 (sec. 8, par. 996, 1007); at 23 (sec. 11, par. 1078) (2001), available at http://
europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/rg/en/2001. See also EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcrivrrIEs OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 2000, at 23-25, 34 (sec. 1, par. 765-67,

776); at 14 (sec. 8, par. 925, 999) (2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/
off/rg/en/2000.
14. See Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11.
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economic policy objectives are to be found dispersed throughout the separate policy chapters of the EEC Treaty.
Article 131, laying clown the common commercial policy,
defines its aims as "the progressive abolition of restrictions on
international trade."1 5 It is worth noting that this is an espousal
of the principle of free trade rather than the idea of defending
the industrial or other interests of the Union.16
Community development policy in Article 177.1 "[...] shall
foster
-the sustainable economic and social development of the
developing countries[...
-the smooth and gradual integration of the developing
countries into the world economy;
-the campaign against poverty in the developing countries."17
These aims represent commitments to the values of susin the dealings of the
tainability, market economy, and solidarity
18
Union with the developing world.
Article 177.2 adopts the objective "of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, 18and . . . respecting
human rights and fundamental freedoms.'
Article 177.3 subjects the development policies of the EU
(and, incidentally, of its Member States) to U.N. obligations, a
clear commitment to the international rule of law. 9
The objectives so defined, when brought together in this
way, represent a coherent set of value-based policy goals for the
external relations of the Union.
One area of external activity remains - that of monetary
policy 20 - for which no objectives are established by the TEU.
Perhaps this represents the consensus under liberal economists
15. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra n.5, arts. 131-34, OJ. C 340/3, at 237-38
(1997), 37 I.L.M. at 99, 100 (ex arts. 110-15). See also GOEBEL, ET.AL., supra n.1, at ch.28.
16. See id.
17. Id. art. 177.1, O.J. C 340/3, at 256 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 118 (ex art. 130u).
18. Id. art. 177.2, O.J. C 340/3, at 257 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 118 (ex art. 130u).
19. See id. art. 177.3, OJ. C 340/3, at 257(1997), 37 I.L.M. at 119 (ex art. 130u).
20. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra n.5, art. 111, OJ. C 340/3, at 223-24 (1997),
37 I.L.M. at 185-86 (ex. art. 109) (setting out international monetary provision). See also
Vienna European Council, Presidency conclusions, E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 7 (1998),
(discussing how international
available at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/
monetary relations should be conducted).
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that in today's world of global markets, external monetary policy
is largely powerless. It is nevertheless a curious lacuna.
It is this author's conviction that the concentration of attention on the crisis management aspects of EU external relations,
driven both, by the need to respond to crises and by media and
public interest in conflict, has distracted attention from the way
in which the Union has over the years built up a remarkably coherent approach to its long-term goals in the external relations
field, an approach based largely on the external pursuit of the
same basic principles which guide its own development. What,
then, are these principles?
II. THE VALUES UNDERLYING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
The first three of these principles have been fundamental to
the process of European integration from the beginning. The
others have begun to come into focus more clearly only in the
recent past. Some comments on their nature and on their past
development within the Union will be relevant before discussing
their role in international relations.
A. The Rule of Law
The ordering of society through the application of a framework of laws and regulations based on the will of the people, as
expressed through the democratic process and implemented by
an independent judiciary, has deep roots in Europe, going back
to at least Roman times, so it is no surprise that it should have
been adopted by the EU. What has been surprising, however, is
that the enforcement of EU law, which overrides national law in
areas of EU legal competence, 2 1 has been successfully entrusted
to national courts, under the overall umbrella of the European
Court ofJustice ("ECJ"). No parallel system of European Courts
has been established along the lines of the U.S. Federal Courts.
Nor over many years were the decisions of the ECJ the object of
attack on the grounds of their political activist nature, as has
often been the case for the U.S. Supreme Court. This is surely
one of the great success stories of European integration. What is
as yet unclear is whether this situation has now changed in the
21. For a discussion on Court ofJustice Doctrine of Supremacy of EC law, see GOEsupra n.1, at ch.7.

BEL, ET.AL.,
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light of suggestions to create a new Court to adjudicate on issues
of legal competence.
More recently, the development of an EU consensus on certain aspects of the legal system such as evidentiary standards; the
rights of the accused; and the definition of cruel and unusual
forms of punishment, such as the death penalty, has emerged
from the work of the Council of Europe and, through the Charter of Fundamental Rights,2 2 become a part of the EU itself. This
is of importance not only for the work of the Convention, but
also for the content of foreign policy.
B. The Market Economy
In principle, a reliance on the market has characterized the
EU since the inception of the European Economic Community
("EEC"). It is on this basis that the Common Market was created, the competition policy implemented, and the Single Market created. In practice, however, it coexisted with the practice
of State intervention in many areas, with the Marxist idea that
the people should have control over "the commanding heights"
of the economy, and with the idea of there being "natural monopolies" in areas such as telecommunications, transport, or energy provision.
Within the last decade, economic policies in Europe have
swung decisively away from an interventionist model and towards
a reliance on competition within open markets to generate economic growth and prosperity. The remnants of an interventionist industrial policy have been dismantled at the EU level; telecommunications and air transport have been completely deregulated; State-owned enterprises have been largely privatized by
Member States, or at least made subject to competition from private companies on the basis of a level playing field achieved by
regulatory means. This change is not the result of changes in
the political complexion of governments but rather a sea-change
in the cross-party consensus. It has gone hand-in-hand with the
development of an international consensus along similar lines.
22. See E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 171-77 (2000), at http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/
bull/en/200012/sommai0o.htm (discussing Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ("Fundamental Rights Charter")). See also Fundamental Rights Charter,
art. 2(2), 4, 47-50, O.J. C 364/1 (2000), available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/default_en.htm.
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C. Democracy and Human Rights
It has always been understood that the Union could only
have democratic States as members. For this reason it was the
reintroduction of democracy in first, Greece and then, Spain
and Portugal, that paved the way for their accession. After the
fall of Communism, this principle was codified in the text
adopted by the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993,
setting out the criteria to judge whether a candidate for membership of the EU could be admitted or not.2" The principle of
democracy has since been spelled out as Article 6.1 of the
TEU.2 4
Article 6.2 of the TEU also incorporates the principle of the
respect of human rights, defined as those guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR").25 In addition, the European
Council in Nice (December 7-9, 2000) welcomed the joint proclamation by the Council, the Parliament, and the Commission of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, combining in a single text
civil, political, economic, social, and societal rights from various
sources. 26 Since Nice, the TEU also sets out (in Article 7) the
steps to be taken if a Member State is in serious breach of these
principles.2 7
In this way, the original implied assumption of democracy
has gradually been spelled out in detail and partially codified.
23. See Copenhagen European Council, Presidency conclusions, E.C. BULL., no. 6,
at 7 (1993), available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/ec/cop-en.htm.
Membership in the EU requires that a candidate country possess the following three
criteria: (1) stability of institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and protection of minorities; (2) a functioning market economy and an ability to
co-exist with competition and market forces within the Union; and (3) the ability to
comply with membership obligations, including political, economic and monetary
union aims (the Community acquis) [hereinafter Copenhagen criteria]. The candidate
country should also adjust its administrative structures to permit effective implementation of EC legislation. Id.
24. See Consolidated TEU, supra n.4, art. 6.1, O.J. C 340/2, at 153 (1997), 37 I.L.
M. at 13 (ex art. F).
25. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
26. See Nice European Council, Presidency conclusions, E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 8
(2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/.
27. See Consolidated TEU, supra n.4, art. 7, OJ. C 340/2, at 154 (1997), 37 I.L.M.
at 14 (ex art. F.1). The Treaty of Nice of December 2000, still unratified, will further
amend the Consolidated TEU in important ways. See draft Treaty of Nice, Feb. 26,
2001, O.J. C80/1 (Mar. 10, 2001).
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D. Solidarity

The political development of Europe has been dominated
since the Second World War by the ideas of Social and Christian
Democratic parties. Their enduring legacy is surely the principle of the social safety net: the idea that society will look after all
its citizens by ensuring that they can live lives of reasonable comfort and dignity, even if they are unable to earn the income necessary to this end. In this sense, Europe has espoused the model
of a Social Market Economy, regarded by many as fundamentally
different in concept from the U.S. model.
The same principle of solidarity is codified in Title XVII of
the EEC Treaty, where Article 158 commits the Union to "aim at
reducing disparities between the levels of development of the
various regions and the backwardness of the least favored regions or islands, including rural areas."2 8 In practice, this has
meant a systematic transfer of financial resources from richer to
poorer Member States. z" It is also an important justification for
treating agriculture differently from other sectors, within the
context of a market economy. The system can be seen not only
as an expression of political solidarity, but also as a necessary
complement to the free play of market forces, which could otherwise lead to increasing disparities.
The emphasis on minority rights within the human rights
policies of the EU can also be seen as an expression of solidarity
with minority groups, who might otherwise feel disadvantaged by
the operation of democratic decision-making at national level. It
is currently playing an important role in ensuring that problems
of minorities do not lead to unrest within some candidate countries.3
28. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra n.5, art. 158, O.J. C 340/3, at 250 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 112 (ex art. 130a).
29. See description of the work of the Cohesion Fund, available at http://europa.
eu.int/comm/regional-policy/funds/procf/cfen.htm.
30. See Copenhagen criteria, supra n.23 (citing protection of minorities as one Copenhagen criteria). See also discussions of minority rights (e.g. of Russians) in Estonia
in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2001 REGULAR REPORT ON ESTONIA'S
PROGRESS TOWARD ACCESSION, SEC (2001) 1747, at 19-24 (Nov. 13, 2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2001/eeen.pdf; 2000 REGULAR REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON ESTONIA'S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION, at 17-21 (Nov.
8, 2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/reportl11_00/pdf/
en/es-en.pdf; Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Estonia's Applicationfor Membership
of the European Union, Doc. 97/12, at 16-20 Only 15, 1997), available at http://europa.
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E. Sustainability
The Single European Act ("SEA") added, for the first time,
the area of environmental policy to the areas of first pillar activity,' thereby formalizing a long-standing de facto practice, and
Maastricht developed this further. It was, however, the Rio conference on sustainable development of 1992 that really began to
focus attention on the global dimension of this issue, followed by
the Kyoto Protocol on Global Climate Change.3 2 The concept
was first incorporated into the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam, and Article 2EEC now defines the aim of the Union's
economic policies as promoting "a harmonious, balanced and
sustainable development."3 3 The adoption by the European
Council at Gothenburg in June 2001 of a Strategy for Sustainaeu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/opinions/estonia/es-op-en.pdf. For a discussion of
minority rights (e.g. of Russians) in Latvia see COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2001 REGULAR REPORT ON LATVIA'S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION, SEC(2001)
1749, at 20-28 (Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/
report_ 1099/pdf/en/estonia-en.pdf; 2000 REGULAR REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION
ON LATVIA'S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION, 19-24 (Nov. 8, 2000), available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/reportll_00/pdf/en/lven.pdf;
Agenda 2000 Commission Opinion on Latvia's Applicationfor Membership of the European Union, Doc. 97/
14, at 16-21 (July 15, 1997), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enargement/report_10_99/pdf/en/estonia en.pdf. For a discussion of minority rights (e.g. of Hungarians) in Romania see COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2001 REGULAR
REPORT ON ROMANIA'S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION, SEC(2001) 1753, at 22-30 (Nov.
14, 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report10_99/pdf/
en/estonia-en.pdf; 2000 REGULAR REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON ROMANIA'S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION, 19-25 (Nov. 8, 2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/enlargement/report 10_99/pdf/en/estonia-en.pdf; Agenda 2000 - Commission
Opinion on Romania's Applicationfor Membership of the European Union, Doc. 97/18, at 1519 (July 15, 1997), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/opinions/romania/ro-op-en.pdf. For a discussion of minority rights (e.g. of Hungarians) in
Slovakia see COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2001 REGULAR REPORT ON
SLOVAKIA'S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION, SEC (2001) 1754, at 20-25 (Nov. 13, 2001),
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2001/sk-en.pdf;
2000
REGULAR REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON SLOVAKIA'S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION,

18-22 (Nov. 8, 2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/reportI l_00/pdf/en/sk-en.pdf; Agenda 2000- Commission Opinion on Slovakia's Applicationfor
Membership of the European Union, Doc. 97/20, at 19-23 (July 15, 1997), availableat http:/
/europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/opinions/slovakia/sk-op-en.pdf.
31. See Single European Act ("SEA"), effective July 1, 1987. See also Consolidated
EC Treaty, supra n.5, arts. 174-76, O.J. C 340/3, at 254-56 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 116-18(ex
arts. 130r-130t).
32. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Global
Climate Change, U.N. Doc. No. FCCC/CP/1997/7/ Add.1 (Dec. 11, 1997).
33. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra n.5, art. 2, O.J. C 340/3, at 181 (1997), 37 I.L.M.
at 43 (ex art. 3).
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ble Development has begun to turn this into practical policy.34
This is one of very few examples of an international discussion then being reflected in internal changes within the Union.
The driving force behind it was the consciousness of global environmental interdependence - we are all citizens of "Spaceship
Earth" - and the need for international solidarity in dealing
with it. Nevertheless, the discussion has triggered the realization
that EU policies have an obligation to ensure that our children
and children's children are afforded the same opportunities for
a good life as are we, and thus, the need to ensure that economic
development preserves and does not diminish the resources, natural and otherwise, on which it is based. In this sense it can also
be interpreted as a principle of intergenerational solidarity.
F. Preservation of Personal and National Identity
and CulturalDiversity
It has been apparent since the beginning of the European
integration process that any attempt to apply a melting-pot approach to Europe with the aim of creating a European national
identity replacing national identities was doomed to failure.
There is, however, no doubt that it remained the secret dream of
many of those involved in the construction of Europe. Over
time it has, however, given ground to quite a different conception of integration, which accepts that the aim is to give the EU
the capacity for effective action in pursuit of its goals by sharing
sovereignty, but also while preserving those elements of national,
regional, or ethnic identity which are so essential to the wellbeing of its citizens.
It has often been assumed by those opposing the sharing of
sovereignty, that the defense of identity is the same as the defense of national sovereignty, and the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity in Maastricht was argued largely along these
lines.3 5 It has proved difficult to devise clear criteria by which to
judge which tasks should be assigned to the EU level and which
should remain at national or sub-national level and the Convention is likely to struggle mightily with this task. What may help is
34. See G6teborg European Council, Presidency conclusions (June 2001), available
at http://ue.eu.int/presid/conclusions.htm.
35. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra n.5, art. 5, O.J.C. 340/3, at 182-83 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 44-45 (ex art. 3b) (added by the Treaty of Maastricht).
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to realize that citizens are more attached to certain functions being performed at the local level than others, because the tasks
are associated in their minds with the political entity, which most
closely corresponds to their sense of identity. It was once believed, e.g., that this included the issuing of a currency, although
initial experience with the introduction of the Euro suggests that
this was exaggerated.
What seems clear is that citizens are attached to local control over decisions impacting directly on their daily lives and are
less concerned with those affairs of the State, such as foreign
policy, whose impact is indirect. If this suggests that the EU
should indeed move in the ultimate direction of creating a European army, a caveat is nevertheless in order. Once one's sons
and daughters go into action, the impact on individual lives is
direct and immediate. Perhaps such an army should have units
with an identifiable regional identity (and indeed uniform) as
the British Army once had with its county regiments.
The corollary is that increased attention should be given to
areas currently of Community competence, for which central decision-making or implementation seems to most often generate
a visceral, identity-related opposition, with a view to returning
them to national or sub-national competence. This may be true,
e.g., for some regulations affecting the food we eat or when local
customs, which reflect a particular cultural tradition, are called
into question. In such cases the protection of local cultural identities should be weighed in the balance with arguments based on
the perfectioning of the Single Market. Some market imperfection may be a small price to pay for the respect of the identity of
our citizens.
A lesson can also be learned from the implementation of
EU law by national courts. To the extent that the implementation of EU policies can be decentralized to the Member State
level, as is currently being suggested for merger control decisions,3 6 this can bolster the sense of national self-worth, without
which pride in national identity becomes more difficult to maintain. It may also be useful to reflect whether the idea of devolving the implementation of policies to Member States could not
be pursued in the area of external relations. The execution of
36. See White Paperon Reform of Regulation 17, Feb. 29, 2000. Summary of the White
Paper is available at http://www.legal500.com/devs/uk/ec/ukee_130.htm.
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Union external policies is currently hampered by the fragmentation of its diplomacy. In operations within the U.N, to take but
one example, it is common for the Presidency or the Commission to express one view on behalf of the Union, while individual
Member States express other, sometimes conflicting views. 7 At
the same time, neither the Commission nor most Presidencies
have the diplomatic and negotiating capacity to represent the
Union with the weight its positions deserve. A pooling of negotiating capacity by having the Union represented by Delegations
adequately staffed by diplomats from both EU institutions and
Member States, but speaking exclusively on behalf of the Union,
would both, allow the Union to function more effectively, and
remove the temptation for individual Member States to think
they could do it better. It would also make clear that a more
effective foreign policy need not imply the abolition, even in the
longer term, of Member State diplomatic services, which represent an important element of national identity.
Finally, these considerations suggest that the EU could well
develop positive policies designed to maintain and even promote national and regional identities and cultures. These
should not be seen as something to be simply accepted as a constraint while pursuing integration, but rather, as an essential ingredient in the European model and a prerequisite for its wholehearted acceptance by its citizens.
III. A VALUES-BASEL) FOREIGNPOLICY FOR THE EU
All six principles outlined above have, or should have, their
equivalents in the external relations of the Union. It is well
worth spelling this out in some detail because the EU is clearly
committed to reaching its external policy goals where possible by
the force of argument and through dialogue, with economic
sanctions and military operations in a subsidiary role. If this is
the case, its confidence in its arguments and their credibility in
the world can only benefit- from the realization that the Union
practices what it preaches.

37. See Consolidated TEU, supra n.4, art. 19, O.J. C 340/2, at 159 (1997), 37 I.L.M.
at 19 (ex art. J.9) (stating that States should coordinate their action in international
organizations).
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A. The Rule of Law
The international rule of law has developed as a result of
two different traditions. The network of international bilateral
agreements and of decisions based on them has led to the
growth over many years of an established body of what is normally called "international law." Alongside this, a system of multilateral agreements has been negotiated at an accelerating
rhythm, originally to regulate diplomatic and military relations
between States (the Vienna Conventions); more recently to regulate international economic relations (World Trade Organization ("WTO")), International Telecommunications Union
("ITU"), International Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO"),
and World Meteorological Organization ("WMO"), etc.; or to
provide more broadly an embryonic system of governance for
dealing with global problems (the U.N. system).3
The public spotlight usually falls on the U.N.'s role in crisis
management through the Security Council. What this fails to
highlight is the web of multilateral conventions, which has been
built up over the years through painstaking negotiation in the
General Assembly. What this has done is to provide the world in
many areas with a set of rights (largely of individuals) and of
obligations (largely of States), similar to the laws in an individual
State. Their implementation, of course, is largely left to peer
pressure, except in cases in which the Security Council determines that there is a risk to world security as defined under Article VII of the U.N. Charter.3 ' This situation will now begin to
change as the International Criminal Court ("ICC") 4 ° begins its
work. It is, however, worth noting that international rules can
indeed be invoked against an individual State, and its views overruled, in the case of the WTO dispute settlement procedure,
since the effective power of veto of an individual State was removed at the end of the Uruguay Round.
The International Court in the Hague is also, of course,
38. Vienna Conventions, concluded at Vienna, May 23, 1969; World Trade Organization, established January 1, 1995; International Telecommunications Union, established May 17, 1865; International Civil Aviation Organization, founded Dec. 7, 1944;
World Meteoriological Organization, established March 23, 1950; United Nations
("U.N."), established October 24, 1945.
39. See United Nations Charter, art. VII, U.N.C.I.O. XV, 335 (June 26, 1945).
40. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
183/9 (1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/.
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often thought of as a world instrument for the settlement of disputes arising in bilateral relations between States and indeed, it
is. But since it can only arbitrate on disputes in cases in which all
concerned parties agree to abide by its findings, it is more in the
nature of an arbitrator than a court in the normal sense of the
word.
It is undoubtedly the EU, which is the foremost proponent
of this system of multilateral rules and of the rights-based approach to dealing with the problems of the world community. It
can continue to be so in the future, secure in the knowledge that
the EU experience has shown that sovereignty can be successfully shared, without infringing on the essential prerogatives of
the states, which share it. In passing, it should be noted that if
enlargement negotiations are to be regarded as part of external,
relations, the EU is indeed engaged in exporting its codex of law
(the "acquis")4 1 to all those who are candidates to join it. This is
the logical extension of the Copenhagen criteria, which define
the conditions for a candidate country to be accepted as a legitimate aspirant for membership of the Union.4 2
Lastly, it is worth emphasizing that many would argue that
EU support of the multilateral system can be seen as adopting
the sharing of sovereignty as a basic principle of governance in
an increasingly interdependent world, and for the same basic
reasons as it has chosen to develop methods for sovereignty sharing in its own integration.
What exactly has happened in Europe? It is indeed a momentous change, which has taken place in the last half century.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, European politicians
were sobered by the experience of war and conscious that the
unbridled pursuit of individual national interests had contributed largely to it. They were also conscious of how little each of
them individually was master of his destiny, how little individual
sovereignty was worth if it could not deliver practical results. A
new world required a new solution. And the idea of sharing sovereignty within what is now the EU was born.
This perhaps explains why the EU is such a firm proponent
41. See generally Roger J. Goebel, The European Union Grows: the ConsitutionalImpact
of the Accession ofAustria, Finlandand Sweden, 18 FoDnHAm INT'L L.J. 1092 (1995); see also
Roger J. Goebel, The Euro: a New Single Currencyfor Europe?Legal Framework, 4 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 249 (1998).
42. See Copenhagen criteria, supra n.23.
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of the multilateral system in world affairs. Our view is that the
same analysis, which has led us to embrace shared sovereignty in
Europe, applies mutatis mutandis to the wider world, albeit across
a narrower range of policy fields. The argument is that the enormous expansion of cross-border trade in goods and services, in
foreign direct investment and international telecommunications, and the services they facilitate, has created a global economy in which all national economies are inextricably embedded.
This increasing economic interdependence means that in
most countries governments are largely powerless to impose
their will on their economies if this implies acting contrary to
international markets. The history of the last decade is littered
with the failed attempts of governments who have tried.
Growing interdependence has another consequence. It
means that the actions of those governments, whose economies
have the strongest links to other economies, will impact on the
well-being of the citizens of others. This is also true outside of
the area of strict economic interdependence in the field of the
global environment. Here, the evidence is now incontrovertible:
greenhouse gas emissions in Europe or in North America can
contribute to the magnitude of floods in Bangladesh or to the
incidence of hurricanes in the Caribbean. In the twenty-first
century, economic acts have become in practice instruments of
foreign policy. In the face of the increasing inability of Nations
to act effectively in pursuit of their interests on an independent
basis, there are three possible alternative reactions:
" accept growing impotence, the inability of a government
to pursue its policy goals;
* act through partnership, collective action, by multilateral
means to effectively pursue common goals; or
* allow the strong to try to impose their will on the weak.
In the last fifty years, the global community has chosen to
pursue the multilateral route and reject the others. More and
more areas are now subject to multilateral rules, from trade and
finance through telecommunications and global environmental
issues to non-proliferation and human rights. All are areas in
which the ability of a single State to achieve its aims on its own
are severely limited.
It is probably correct that Europeans are now the foremost
proponents of multilateral governance. After all, we have seen
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that sharing sovereignty is both, effective, and politically acceptable. As a principle for determining the content of our foreign
policy it could well stand on its own, although I have chosen
here to treat it simply as a logical extension of the Rule of Law
into an interdependent world.
B. The Market Economy
The most obvious external expression of the EU's commitment to the market economy is, of course, its championing of
trade liberalization under the WTO. More generally, it is, however, the championing of a form of market economy, which has
worked well in Europe. It is thus no surprise that the EU fought
so hard in the run up to Doha for several issues, without which
we believe that the benefits of a market economy do not become
available to citizens. These include policies to ensure that competition reigns in open markets; that policies are put into place
to ensure that benefits are passed on equitably though the adoption of core labor standards (an application of the principle of
solidarity as well as the respect of one aspect of human rights);
and that the process of liberalization of trade in particular, and
of globalization in general, are managed in such a way that they
benefit all countries.4 3 Hence, the emphasis on the need for
Doha to lead to a result to the benefit of developing countries.
Apart from this having been a negotiating necessity to get the
new round launched, it is a clear expression of solidarity on the
part of Europe with the rest of the world community.
Finally, it should be clear that the EU will continue, as it did
in the Uruguay Round, to emphasize that liberalization which
threatens cultural identity is not acceptable and that trade rules
need to reflect a balance between the benefits that accrue from
openness and the need to maintain cultural diversity in the
world, as we do in Europe.
In this area of international economic, policy the Union's
projection of a clear picture of a broadly accepted, widely implemented, and coherent economic policy consensus is still, of
course, marred by the continued existence of an agricultural
policy, which remains interventionist and non-market in nature,
43. See World Trade Organization, Negotiations, Implementation, and Development: the
Doha Agenda, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tratop-e.htm (providing information on agenda set by Doha Ministerial Conference).
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even if its parameters have gradually been adjusted to bring its
results more into line with those, which the market could be supposed to deliver. This remains unfinished business, to be dealt
with as the twin pressures of enlargement and the Doha trade
negotiations push the Union towards applying its own principles
to this anomaly. In doing so, however, the Union should not
forget its principle of solidarity with the citizens of its rural areas.
C. Democracy and Human Rights
The European Nations have espoused democracy because
they believe it to be the form of national governance offering the
greatest chance of a good life for the members of a society. But
the operation of this form of decision-making is subject, in most
democratic systems, to the constraints of entrenched legislation,
most often in the form of a constitution, often setting out a list
of protected human rights, and watched over by an independent
judiciary.
What would be the international expression of this type of
governance? For the moment, the idea that democracy is the
best way to make decisions has been gaining ground simply
through the spread of democratic forms of government from
one country to another in the latter part of the last century, and
the legitimacy of world institutions such as the U.N. can be regarded as increasing as more and more of its member States become democratic. This assumes that the indirect legitimacy
coming from the expression of the will of governments in international affairs is a reflection of their own direct national legitimacy.
It should, however, be noted that most democracies are in
fact moving away from the model of purely representative democracy towards much more participatory forms, in which transparency about their operation, coupled with the growth of media activity, has defacto increased the weight of the views of civil
society expressed not just though the ballot box, but also on a
continuing basis. The international corollary is the increasing
transparency of the U.N. system and the growing participatory
role granted to non-governmental organizations ("NGOs")
within it. It seems likely that further national experiments with
democratic governance will continue to be reflected internation-
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ally and the EU would do well to play a leading role in such
discussions.
The international equivalent of national entrenched legislation is of several types. First, is the multilateral system itself, to
which changes can normally only be made by consensus, a rather
extreme form of entrenchment. Second, is the system of international conventions, which are then implemented in national
law, thus leading to a convergence of national legal systems.
Third, is the codex of human rights, which has been built up
over the last decades. While being "soft" law in the sense that
there is usually no legally binding enforcement mechanism, this
codex, representing as it does the evolving consensus of the
world community, undoubtedly affects the way that Nations behave and is "enforced", in practice, by a series of mechanisms
designed to exert peer pressure. The world is even moving beyond that now in the case of the ICC, by establishing an enforcement mechanism for the trial of those who commit crimes
against humanity (which are defined extremely carefully in enumerative fashion in order to guard against frivolous misuse). For
the first time, an instrument is available on a permanent basis,
which can ensure the rule of law by methods other than simple
exhortation or brute force.
The EU itself contributes to the spread of the respect for
human rights by incorporating this respect as an element of its
trade and cooperation agreements, of which the Cotonou agreement with ACP countries4 4 is certainly the best example. The
Stabilization and Association Agreements with the countries of
the western Balkans4 5 are another.
Let it here, however, be admitted that the values-based approach in this area does not always prevail over Realpolitik. Many
would argue, even in Europe, that this is the case vis-d-vis China,
many Americans would mention countries like Iran, North Korea, and Libya. But even in such cases it is clear that the Realpolitiker are having to argue their case against the presumption of a
values-based approach, which thus serves as an important point
of reference.
44. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANNUAL REPORT 2001, at 126, par. 6 (2001),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres0l_e/pr226_e.htm (citing Cotonore Convention held inJune 2000 between the European Community and 72 developing countries).
45. See id. at 32 (citing to Croatia Stabilization and Association Agreements).
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To sum up, the EU's policy in this area of promoting national democratic governance, supporting the multilateral system, and pushing for the extension of the international rightsbased system, is nothing other than the transposition to the international arena of principles, which we apply at home, with the
full support of a consensus within our societies. It is this, which
gives the policy its credibility.
D. Solidarity
It is easy to demonstrate solidarity with a good neighbor in
theory. In practice, solidarity is a slippery concept, and in Europe, institutional solidarity certainly goes beyond providing assistance to close neighbors. But, as-pointed out above, it is firmly
anchored in the European model of society.
Two relatively new phenomena have made it easier to contemplate the extension of the concept internationally. The first,
is the growing realization of the extent of ecological interdependence on our planet.4 6 The other is the ability of the international media to beam pictures of suffering from the furthest corners of the globe into our living rooms. The realization of the
misery of other human beings like us evokes the simple human
reaction of sympathy, and out of sympathy genuine solidarity in
action can grow.
On this basis the political constituency to support the
strengthening of international instruments of solidarity - of
which the most obvious is Official Development Assistance
("ODA") - can be cultivated, thus allowing ODA to be increased, in line with international commitments, and as reinforced in Monterrey. Emphasizing the importance of international solidarity, thus, provides an argument based on European
core values to place alongside the argument based simply on the
crude idea of buying friends, which has less pulling power at
home, and less credibility abroad.
The Union's commitment to this principle is enshrined in
the Preamble to the EC Treaty, which states: "intending to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas countries."4 7
46. See Part II E. Sustainability, infra.
47. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra n.5, Preamble, O.J. C 340/3, at 179 (1997),
37 I.L.M. 79. at 41.
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E. Sustainability
Sitting writing this Essay in New York City, experiencing yet
another day of record, unseasonable temperatures, it is difficult
not to be aware of the reality of global climate change and the
international discussion on what to do about it. On this, as on
all other issues related to international ecological interdependence, there is simply no viable alternative but to pursue accelerated multilateral action and the EU will certainly continue to
take the lead in this. It is the thesis of this Essay that the EU's
ability to rally a world consensus behind its ideas will depend
crucially on its own actions domestically. If the EU is seen to be
implementing policies designed to make its own development
sustainable, its credibility on the international stage will grow
correspondingly.
F. Preservation of PersonalIdentity and CulturalDiversity
Europe is a microcosm of the world community in that it is
a mosaic of overlapping, distinct ethnic groups with clearly defined cultural differences and political borders inherited from
the past, which only partially reflect these ethnic groups. The
European experience of sharing sovereignty in order to more
effectively pursue its interests, while respecting these cultural
and ethnic differences, can surely provide lessons as to how the
world community can deal with similar problems.
If the problems associated with revolutionary struggles for
self-determination by ethnic groups within historically defined
States are to be dealt with without creating the crises with which
the Security Council so often struggles, it will surely be by implementing on a global scale the type of policies pursued by the EU
both, within its borders, and by the extension of the acquis to the
candidate countries and to the other Balkan States.
This provides ajustification in the area of foreign and security policy to go alongside that of rendering economic globalization more acceptable4" for placing the propagation of the principle of the respect of cultural identity alongside the other core
values of EU external relations.
Finally, the international relations of the Union would be
greatly improved if the cultural differences exhibited by our
48. See Part II B. The Market Economy, infra.
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partners could be seen not so much as problems creating difficulties for the realization of our objectives, but rather, as a positive value to be preserved. There is no doubt, e.g., that this type
of change of mindset on the part of the Union was a decisive
factor in the improvement of our relations with Japan in the first
half of the nineties. It would also fit well with the declared intention of the U.N. to promote a dialogue among civilizations and
to avoid Huntington's nightmare of a clash of civilizations.
CONCLUSION
In an imperfect world there will always be instances in which
the Union is called upon to defend its interests against attack,
whether this takes the form of military aggression, economic coercion, or terrorist activity, and it will need the capacity to defend itself and to defend others in the world community. This is
the domain of Realpolitik and of Security and Defense Policy.
But such reactive policy is insufficient to provide its foreign policy with a clear vision and a clear European identity. For this,
the EU needs to define what it wants the world to look like, it
needs to set out a clear statement of its values.
The implication is clear. In pushing for political change in
the world, the only alternative to the use of coercion, so alien to
most Europeans after the two World Wars of the last century, is
the power of ideas. And the credibility of the EU's ideas is in
direct proportion to the extent to which it applies, and is seen to
apply, these ideas within its own borders. It is for this reason
that the development of the Union's external policies will be intimately related to the process and results of the Convention. If
the Convention can build more explicitly on the body of core
principles, which have been developed over the years, it can
make clear that these same, few, easily-understood principles,
can provide the basis not only for the Union's internal construction, but also for its external identity. This can also provide a key
to avoiding public alienation from the process of European integration and ensuring public support for the Union's policies, because if our citizens believe that these widely accepted principles
are the answer to the question "What does Europe stand for?",
they will have a reason not just to grudgingly accept European
integration, but to be proud of it.
Finally, the above analysis suggests that the Convention
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could clarify the legal basis for the EU's external relations by
revising Article 11 of the TEU and distinguishing between its
value-based elements, as set out above, with the addition of those
currently in the EEC Treaty, and its interests-based elements, viz.
crisis management and other elements of security and defense
policy. Since the former are nothing other than the external
expression of agreed internal values, it is difficult to see why decision-making on these areas of foreign policy should not be
based on the Community method, with co-decision by the European Parliament.4 9 The latter could then be clearly seen for
what they are: an expression of the old but still valid paradigm
based on individual States defending their interests, and should
remain the domain of interacting governments, rather than an
expression of the collective values of the Union.

49. The European Parliament power of co-decision applies to most EC internal
market and other legislation. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra n.5, art. 95, O.J. C 340/
3, at 213-15 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 75-77 (ex art. 100a).

